

Cynthia McKinney
Research Redesign Learning Achievement
Submitted January 2013

INTRODUCTION

There is “hard science” and then there is what we political scientists do. Is Political Science, science? This is a question that I certainly will not be able to answer or a discussion that I can interject myself into in any definitive kind of way because my voice does not yet count in the Academy. And it appears that while this question may not have even been answered definitively by those who hold sway over definitions and characteristics of “knowledge” and “ways of knowing,” in the real world of the low-lying swamp, practice at just about every college or university affirms that political science is science. And while the tools of a political scientist are more varied than those of “hard” scientists, today’s academic practices indicate that the merits of those tools can be discussed by an elite corps of scientists while the world continues to turn. And hard answers need to be provided to important questions whose answers cannot be satisfactorily obtained by “counting jelly beans.”¹

The issue of what is knowledge and what is an acceptable way of obtaining knowledge continues to rage within academic circles. Research is the process by which knowledge is acquired, shared, or enhanced. Peer-reviewed research is systematic, rigorous, and empirical.² Systematic in that there are formal procedures “for setting up the investigation, collecting and analyzing data, and interpreting results.” Rigorous in that the investigation “employs procedures designed to reduce and control bias.” And empirical in that the data are “in the form of numbers, such as scores or frequencies or in the form of text, such as interview transcripts.”³ My point in doing research is to better understand my environment and to rigorously explore the questions that I pose to myself so

¹ The issue of race in the United States is one of those tough questions that cannot be answered by merely “counting jelly beans,” as even Texaco executives have attested. In fact, Texaco executives referred to their Black employees as “black jelly beans.” More can be learned about this at PBS Newshour located at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/november96/texaco_11-12.html accessed January XX, 2013.

² See James McMillan and Jon Wergin, *Understanding and Evaluating Educational Research*, Fourth Edition, Boston: Pearson, 2010, 1.

³ McMillan and Wergin, *Understanding*, 1.

that I can impact my life and the lives of others.⁴ I desperately want to make change. But before I can engage in the proper research properly, I must know myself, especially understanding the biases that I bring to my research.

I must also understand how I “am” and understand the assumptions I hold on how others “are” or “become.” Inherent in any research is author “positionality.” Positionality entails where the researcher is “coming from” in the research. Whether that research is qualitative or quantitative, researcher positionality is present and is important to acknowledge. Research can be seriously critiqued on any of these three grounds—or others.

Both qualitative and quantitative research begin with a question that needs to be answered. But how one goes about answering that question determines into what category, qualitative or quantitative, that research falls. Qualitative research can be Theoretical, Phenomenological, Hermeneutic, Ethnographic, Narrative, Historical or Comparative, Arts-based, Case Study, Action, or Grounded Theory while Quantitative research can be done as Correlational, Evaluation, or Experimental.⁵ To Kenny’s Wheel of Inquiry, Wergin’s “Decision Tree for Classifying Research Designs” adds Single-subject, Quasi-experimental, Randomized Experimental, and Ex-post Facto designs.⁶

Qualitative research tells us a lot about a particular subject while quantitative research seeks to tell us what is generalizable about one subject in a variety of circumstances. For example, clinical trials of particular pharmaceuticals meant to affect a particular population constitute important quantitative research that seeks to inform us how particular drugs affect different individuals from that particular population. A qualitative approach to the same question would not necessarily be generalizable to an entire population because of the different tools used in the research and a different goal in conducting the research. Some researchers have chosen to mix methods, using both quantitative and qualitative tools to provide the richness and texture that qualitative research provides while still being able to generalize about a particular population. A mixed methods approach to the question of pharmaceutical efficacy might consist of both collecting data from physical tests and indicators and in-depth interviews of selected participants in order to better understand the nature of, say, the side effects experienced by users of the drug.

⁴ According to Antioch University Ph.D. in Leadership and Change co-founders, Al Guskin and Laurien Alexandre, that is also why the AU program was started.

⁵ Carolyn Kenny, “Wheel of Inquiry Possibilities.”

⁶ McMillan and Wergin, *Understanding*, 5.

Maybe a better example of why the contention between research methods exists can be viewed in the differences between the types of answers one gets if one asks, for example, what the melting temperature of steel is versus what is the explanation for a burning building falling at freefall speed within its footprint when fire alone does not reach the melting temperature of steel. In other words, one question allows for an answer that is quite definitive. The other question allows only for answers that are more questions. A quantitative approach to the second question could consist of surveys of architects and engineers, but would that method give us information that we could use to answer the question specifically about Building Seven at New York's World Trade Center on September 11, 2001? A qualitative approach to the question might consist of comparative case studies of other burning buildings and whether they collapsed or not, or even better, an in-depth study of Building Seven of the World Trade Center consisting of surveys and interviews of architects, engineers, first responders, Building Seven workers, Building Seven designers, and others who might have been witnesses to the collapse or experts in the building's design. Not only is the nature of the question and the answer we seek dependent upon the methodology that we use, but the answer we get is also dependent on our methodology. Therefore, methodology is not merely an impartial bystander in research. What this means is that for research about events that take place in the low-lying swamp,⁷ the question asked is just as important in determining the methodology to be used in seeking an answer as are the underlying assumptions that define the methodology. Some questions simply cannot be answered by quantitative methodologies alone.

However, the reason we even have this conversation taking place in universities' ivy-covered towers is because among some researchers there is the opinion that a hierarchy of research methods exists and that quantitative methods are more scientific and therefore more valid. Researchers who dogmatically hold this view believe that usable knowledge can be found only at the end of a logarithmic equation. The qualitative/quantitative debate also fissured over the question of inductive versus deductive approaches. In deductive evaluations, the researcher must "decide in advance what variables are important and what relationships among those variables are to be tested. . . . Qualitative researchers ask questions rather than test hypotheses."⁸ Many researchers have found the quantitative methods rather limiting because every question

⁷ D.A. Schon called this terrain the "swampy lowlands" in Donald A. Schon, "The New Scholarship Requires a New Epistemology," *Change* 27, (1995), 26 - 34.

⁸ Michael Quinn Patton, "Utilization-focused evaluation: the new century text," (London: SAGE Publications, 1996), 279.

cannot be answered with a numerical answer. For example, how would one study the phenomenon of evil as a quantitative endeavor? Elliot Isenberg chose phenomenology.⁹ Or explain America's Dark Night as described by Margaret Wheatley?¹⁰ Researchers who found quantitative methodologies lacking, branched out to try additional methodologies. Proponents of these additional methodologies struggle to cement their place in scholarship to this day. Michael Patton pointed out that in his opinion, the paradigms debate had "lost its acerbic edge," but that many users of evaluation research—"practitioners, policy-makers, program managers, and funders—remain mired in the simplistic worldview that statistical results (hard data) are more scientific and valid than qualitative case studies (soft data)."¹¹

Two such researchers are Valery Bentz and Jeremy Shapiro who innovated a new context and a new approach that they label "Mindful Inquiry." "Mindful" because all research is person-centered and they prefer to have the person explicitly at the center of the research. They believe their methodology to be "a synthesis of four intellectual traditions: phenomenology, hermeneutics, critical social science, and Buddhism."¹²

Linda Tuhiwai Smith wrote about "decolonizing" methodologies particularly when the research involves people of color. She writes, "This book is a counter-story to Western ideas about the benefits of the pursuit of knowledge."¹³ According to Konai Thaman, a reviewer of Smith's *Decolonizing Methodologies*, "[Smith] recommends research methodologies "culturally sensitive and appropriate instead of those which [research students] have learned about in Research Methods courses in universities which assume that research and research methods are culture-free and that researchers occupy

⁹ Elliot Isenberg, "The Experience of Evil: A Phenomenological Approach," dissertation 1983.

¹⁰ Margaret Wheatley, *Finding Our Way: Leadership for an Uncertain Time*, (San Francisco: Barrett-Koehler Publishers, 2007).

¹¹ Patton, *Utilization-focused*, 267.

¹² Valerie Bentz and Jeremy Shapiro, *Mindful Inquiry in Social Research*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1998), 6.

¹³ Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*, (London: Zed Books, Ltd., 1999), i.

some kind of moral high ground from which they can observe their subjects and make judgments about them.”¹⁴

People of color critiqued that change of the status quo was in order and that a new type of analysis needed to include the need for change. According to John Wallis, Paulo Freire “saw his position as one of no compromise in the sense that one either supports liberation as outlined or not.”¹⁵ Women, too, critiqued those presumably “better” quantitative methodologies as insufficient for an analysis of the impact of power differentials in certain social phenomena. Finally, in a kind of positive scholarship turn, some researchers openly call their very serious research work a kind of “art”¹⁶ and “craft.”¹⁷

PART ONE

Summary of “The Patterning of Repression: FBI Counterintelligence and the New Left,” by David Cunningham¹⁸

Context of the Article

David Cunningham wrote about a unique period in the history of the United States. The period is unique, not so much for what the government did against its own citizens that is startling, but because so much is known about those activities because of the Senate investigation into intelligence activities against U.S. citizens exposing documents from various arms of the U.S. government—documents that the authors never thought would see the light of day. Therefore, this period is unique because it gives the public a glimpse into the activities of the U.S. government when its agents thought no one was watching. Reading the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, known as “The Church Committee” Reports are a saddening account of how every aspect of U.S. society has been penetrated by both the FBI and even the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that

¹⁴ Smith, *Decolonizing*, i.

¹⁵ John Wallis, “The Uncomfortable Responsibility to Problematise Progressive Thinking,” *Paulo Freire Institute Online Journal*, 1 no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2006), 3.

¹⁶ Robert Stake, *The Art of Case Study Research*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1995).

¹⁷ Ann Cunliffe, “Crafting Qualitative Research: Morgan and Smircich 30 Years On,” *Organizational Research Methods* 14 no. 4 (2011): 647 – 673.

¹⁸ David Cunningham, “The Patterning of Repression: FBI Counterintelligence and the New Left,” *Social Forces*, 82, no. 1 (2003): 209 – 240.

was at the time proscribed from engaging in domestic activities. The activities outlined by the Committee Reports include foreign leader assassination conspiracies, surveillance on U.S. activists, even plots to disrupt the marriages of activists.¹⁹

The 1960s and 1970s were a turbulent time for the U.S. Several social justice movements begun by people of color, primarily the Black Civil Rights Movement, had gripped the conscience and the consciousness of the country. Blacks' press for rights was joined by Chicanos, American Indians, Puerto Ricans, and women for the advancement of their own rights. These social justice claims were joined by sympathetic Whites, especially younger Whites who were also mobilized at the time to stop the Vietnam War. These mobilized Whites were known inside the FBI as "The New Left" and a Counter-Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) was run against them, too. The coming-together of these social justice movements is the story of how the people of the United States almost made a successful justice and peace revolution. Especially when juxtaposed to justice and peace events of today, this was, indeed, a unique moment in the life of the U.S.

It was during this time that the intelligence community of the U.S. took sides. The COINTELPRO papers and the Church Committee findings document how pervasively government agents acted to take sides and preserve the claims of the status quo architects. Cunningham asserts that not only totalitarian states, but democratic states, too, are repressive. This is the context within which Cunningham delves into FBI COINTELPRO repressive practices against New Left activists between 1961 and 1971.

Purpose of the Study

Cunningham sought to understand how social protest movements are affected by repression and to "understand the patterning of repression against protest groups"²⁰ in the democratic environment of the United States. The social

¹⁹ For more information on COINTELPRO and the Church Committee Reports please see Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, *The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars Against Dissent in the United States* (Boston: South End Press, 1990) and Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities located at: http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/church/contents_church_reports.htm.

²⁰ David Cunningham, "The Patterning of Repression: FBI Counterintelligence and the New Left," *Social Forces* 82, no. 1 (2003): 209.

movement literature up to Cunningham's research had been conducted with an "implicit assumption . . . that authorities allocate repression . . . in a rational manner."²¹ This research focused on overt repression that occurs after certain protest activity; researchers often focused on the activists who had been repressed; Cunningham chose to focus on covert repression and on those conducting the repression. Therefore, Cunningham's research set its aim directly at the FBI in the COINTELPRO years.

Research Question

Cunningham recognized the limitations in the assumption, in most social movement literature, that repression was meted out on a rational basis. That is, that state agencies "allocate repression purposefully, with the level of repression increasing with the level of threat." Cunningham, then, sought to understand "how organizations allocate repression"²² and whether there was merit in such an assumption. Specifically, Cunningham evaluates "three of the most common claims, namely that level of repression is positively related to protest groups' (1) level of activity, (2) size, and (3) association with previous acts of violence."²³

Methods

The data consisted of 2,487 FBI memos spanning the three-year life of COINTELPRO against the New Left. These memos represent "all known correspondence related to the repression of any New Left target during the time period in question."²⁴ From these FBI memos, Cunningham isolated 59 separate dialogs between FBI Headquarters and individual FBI field offices. Cunningham then coded each memo with "pertinent background information (date, to/from), as well as its type (14 distinct memo types were used, which are listed in Table 1) and intended target. Cunningham paid particular attention to any memo that initiated an action against a target, thus shifting that New Left organization from potential threat to active target. Cunningham does this in order to "test the relative influence of each of the three propositions discussed above, as well as a single proxy of endogenous

²¹ Cunningham, "Patterning," 210.

²² Cunningham, "Patterning," 210.

²³ Cunningham, "Patterning," 217.

²⁴ Cunningham, "Patterning," 216.

organizational structure: whether or not targets were identified and monitored by multiple FBI field offices”²⁵—which Cunningham labels as national targets.

TABLE 1²⁶

#	Memo Types	Number of Memos (1968)	%
1a	Information about target(s)	298	(32.0%)
1b	Quarterly progress report summarizing information about potential activity, pending activity, and tangible results	77	(8.3%)
2	Information about events	93	(10.0%)
3	Proposal for counterintelligence actions against target(s)	150	(16.1%)
4	Action against target(s)	40	(4.3%)
5a	Authorization of proposal by director	68	(7.3%)
5b	Authorization of proposal after revisions by director	9	(1.0%)
6	Rejection of proposal by director	25	(2.7%)
7	Request by director for revision of proposal	27	(2.9%)
8	Request by director for information or proposals against target(s)	52	(5.6%)
9	Recommendation	25	(2.7%)
10	Result of action or update on status of action	46	(4.9%)
11	Revision of proposal by SAC	14	(1.5%)
12	Cancellation of proposal or action by SAC	4	(0.4%)
	Total Memos (April - December 1968)	928	(100%)
	Total Memos (April 1968 - April 1971)	2,487	

²⁵ Cunningham, “Patterning,” 217.

²⁶ Cunningham, “Patterning,” 218.

After defining his variables of interest—size of New Left organization, its level of activity, its association with violence, whether it was a national target or not, and repression as the dependent variable, Cunningham investigated each New Left local group and performed two regression analyses on repression, Models 1 and 2, without and with, respectively, the “national target” variable. “Model 2 replicates the first model but also adds an endogenous organizational indicator: whether each target was recognized as national (i.e., observed by multiple field offices within the FBI).

Results

Cunningham’s results are stunning. Cunningham finds that protest-group characteristics “poorly predict which New Left groups become targeted for COINTELPRO activity.”²⁷ This includes violent activity! Much more significant, according to Cunningham, “groups considered to be national targets were 12.53 times as likely to be repressed as local targets. This relationship is highly significant and dwarfs the effect of the other variables. This finding clearly points to the necessity of accounting for processes within repressing organizations to understand how repression is allocated, rather than assuming that ‘objectively’ larger threats automatically face higher levels of repression.”²⁸ Cunningham then goes on to explain “how endogenous organizational processes shape the allocation of repressive activity by the FBI.”²⁹ He concludes that the level of repression meted out to particular New Left groups is “based on how they were ultimately perceived by the directorate at national headquarters.”³⁰ So, to reiterate, not size, not violence, not high or low activity determined COINTELPRO repression, but directorate perceptions at the national FBI headquarters determined which groups were targeted for repression.

Cunningham’s analysis delivered an R^2 of .12 in Model 1 and of .25 in Model 2, where recognition by FBI Headquarters of a New Left group as a national target was included as one of the predictor variables.

Critique

²⁷ Cunningham, “Patterning,” 220.

²⁸ Cunningham, “Patterning,” 220.

²⁹ Cunningham, “Patterning,” 220 – 221.

³⁰ Cunningham, “Patterning,” 221.

Cunningham used regression analysis to better understand the relationships between repression and variables related to New Left groups. He wanted to be able to determine if one variable or a combination of variables was a predictor of repression. What he found was that the characteristics of New Left groups when sifted through the endogenous processes of FBI headquarters came to determine whether or not a New Left group was targeted for repression. Purely local groups rarely reached the attention of FBI headquarters—even when they committed acts of violence. Yet, even inactive national groups—defined as organizations having local representation in at least two local FBI jurisdictions—were repressed. This finding shatters the “rational actor” assumptions of prior social movement research that repression was meted out according to threat to the status quo or social movement recourse to violence.

Cunningham’s study, innovative and shocking in its results, is not surprising, however. And in this case, Cunningham leaves his audience hungering for more. But, because Cunningham limited himself to New Left organizations, important information for students of COINTELPRO remains lacking.

The story of COINTELPRO is about what the FBI and other government agencies did to repress political dissent in the United States. Unfortunately, its legacy is one of a trail of deaths, including targeted assassinations. When one understands that COINTELPRO targeted Black civil rights leaders from Malcolm X to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to Black Panther Party members including Fred Hampton and American Indian Movement activists like Ana Mae Pictou Aquash and Puerto Rican Independentistas like Filiberto Ojeda Rios—even after COINTELPRO was supposedly shut down by Congress, it is clear that Cunningham has only touched the surface of those endogenous FBI factors that determined what kind of repression was appropriate for what groups. Because Cunningham limits himself to a study of New Left organizations, we will never know from his research the role of race and ethnicity in the severity of repression that was meted out to social movements of color and if there was a difference in FBI headquarters treatment of largely White organizations and those organizations led by people of color. This could have grave consequences for the United States legal standing if it could be shown that the U.S. violated its own laws and international laws and conventions to which it was a signatory.

Cunningham clearly shows us what the next steps are for research in this area. Given the dearth of scholarship involving COINTELPRO and especially COINTELPRO against organizations of color, this clearly is an area for additional study given the changing legal landscape of today. What Senator Frank Church called illegal and un-American activities uncovered in COINTELPRO has been made legal by the Patriot Act, the Secret Evidence Act, the Funding the War

Against Terrorism Act, and justified policies of targeted assassinations abroad by drone warfare, and secret kill lists that even include U.S. citizens. Are such policies still un-American? And if so, what are dissenters to do about them? What kind of repression can dissenters expect? And is the severity of repression race and ethnicity based?

Cunningham's study is so innovative and path-breaking because it shatters the assumption that many researchers held up to the time of his study—2003. His findings should definitely be built upon for further understanding of how repression is allocated by U.S. government agents.

Cunningham could also have used his same comprehensive data set of COINTELPRO–New Left memos and performed Grounded Theory research. He might have arrived at the same conclusions, but his starting point of pre-determined variables would have been different.

Cunningham Re-conceptualized

Cunningham's instinct to challenge the so-called rationalist approach demonstrates to me that what is considered a rational assumption is more easily considered to be rational by those who have not been there—experientially. Therefore, if I had a “hunch” that those assumptions were not merited, I would probably make my first stop in the libraries of those who had been there inside the FBI either as employees who became whistleblowers or informants or infiltrators, paid agents provocateurs, who later told about their experiences. I would read their books and then pursue interviews with them, allowing them to tell their stories with little intervention from me. I would ask them to delve into every aspect of the moments that they spent inside COINTELPRO. For those who were FBI employees, I would ask them how they felt betraying the Constitution and what national security demands could warrant such behavior from our leaders. From the informants and infiltrators, I would ask them about the tactics used and how they felt about the individuals they were being paid to betray—like, for example, Malcolm X or Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., or the members of the Black Panther Party—those who personally knew some of the victims of targeted assassination, like Fred Hampton and “Alprentice “Bunchy” Carter. I would find family members of the targeted individuals and the targeted individuals, themselves, if they were still alive. And I would explore with them the significance of their experiences as U.S. citizens and at the hands of the FBI. This would be the phenomenological exploration of my subject matter. But this would be only the beginning of my journey.

My second stop would have to be with the documents, themselves, that tell an incredible story of lawlessness and interference in the rights of U.S. citizens that few would believe absent the actual documents. Just as Cunningham examined the memos and was able to shatter academic presumptions about the nature of state-sanctioned repression in the context of COINTELPRO, especially, I would not redo his work, but build upon it. Cunningham focused on New Left organizations, only. COINTELPRO operations were carried out against individuals as well as organizations. I would like to explore the level or severity of repression that was experienced by New Left organizations perhaps as a first block upon which to build on Cunningham. Eventually, the question must arise and be answered: What activities of COINTELPRO resulted in murder or assassination? And because Cunningham opens the discussion of the “patterning” of repression, was there such a pattern with other COINTELPRO-targeted organizations?

I think very few people would justify the government actions that were carried out against activists of the 1960s and 1970s in COINTELPRO. Certainly, Senator Frank Church, who headed the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities did not, as can be read in the Committee Reports.³¹ What do these Committee findings mean for the nature of U.S. democracy then and now? This is research that is intended to make a difference: to practitioners inside government, to activists outside government who dissent from its policies, and to inform others around the world who may be tempted to believe things that are not true—about themselves, the nature of government, the United States, itself. At a time when Black organizations were formed to press for Black civil and voting rights, the purpose of COINTELPRO against these organizations according to FBI records was to “expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters, and to counter their propensity for violence and civil disorder.”³² COINTELPRO against the American Indian Movement that pressed for a right to life and self-determination for indigenous people of the Americas resulted in state-sponsored terror and assassination of Native American leaders. COINTELPRO against New Left organizations who had formed to support the social justice claims of the Puerto Ricans, Mexicans,

³¹ See Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities Committee Reports available at http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/contents/church/contents_church_reports.htm.

³² FBI memo dated August 25, 1967 to twenty-two FBI Field Offices across the country. The memo is available in Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, *The COINTELPRO Papers*, (Boston: South End Press, 1990), 92.

Blacks, Native Americans, and against the U.S. war in Vietnam was in essence a pro-war policy apparatus that terrorized peace activists and resulted in the murder of four anti-war students at Kent State University. COINTELPRO was not counter-intelligence, it was counter-democracy. This kind of research that matters and seeks to make a difference falls into the realm of critical social science.

Finally, acknowledging that which is covert and unpleasant, but very real is the beginning of the process of becoming truly aware. I call it being able to see the invisible, hear the unspoken, and read the unwritten. This is an essential skill that determines how aware and self-aware we can truly be.

The methodology that I have just described is mindful inquiry: a holistic way of researching and understanding the U.S. government policy of COINTELPRO.

Rationale for the Redesign

Cunningham shattered inaccurate assumptions with his innovative study of COINTELPRO against New Left organizations. His quantitative analysis of his research project began with a set of pre-defined variables as he endeavored to tease out the exact nature of their inter-relationships with repression. In the redesign as outlined above, the researcher and reader would gain a much more comprehensive understanding of the determinants of the allocation of state-sponsored repression in the case of COINTELPRO. This redesign approach would allow for other variables to be considered than the ones initially offered by Cunningham. This would also build on Cunningham's work by providing a fuller understanding of the totality of circumstances that were brought to bear when an individual or organization was targeted by COINTELPRO. The Church Committee found that the "war" against Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was "no holds barred," according to the testimony of the FBI Agent who ran the COINTELPRO against Dr. King.³³

Purpose of the Redesign

The purpose of the redesign would be to enrich the understanding gained from Cunningham's seminal work that informed us that not even propensity for violence was a predictor of state-sanctioned repression in COINTELPRO.

Methods

³³ Church Committee Reports, Book III, p. 7, found at: http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/book3/html/ChurchB3_0007a.htm, accessed January 4, 2013.

The redesigned Cunningham study would be done utilizing Mindful Inquiry as indicated above, utilizing the methods of Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Critical Social Science, and self-awareness.

Data Collection and Participant Selection

As indicated above, the Cunningham redesign would utilize interviews of available principals and a careful read of their books to understand themes that might be developed; official COINTELPRO documents are voluminous and should be sifted for relevancy and coded according to established project criteria.

Discussion

Discussion of the merits of the redesigned project have been contained throughout this paper. Such a redesign would provide a more comprehensive understanding of COINTELPRO—its motivations and effects on activists in a very important period in the U.S.