By: Cynthia McKinney

Context of the Article

David Cunningham wrote about a unique period in the history of the United States.  The period is unique, not so much for what the government did against its own citizens that is startling, but because so much is known about those activities because of the Senate investigation into intelligence activities against U.S. citizens exposing documents from various arms of the U.S. government—documents that the authors never thought would see the light of day.  Therefore, this period is unique because it gives the public a glimpse into the activities of the U.S. government when its agents thought no one was watching.  Reading the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, known as “The Church Committee” Reports are a saddening account of how every aspect of U.S. society has been penetrated by both the FBI and even the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that was at the time proscribed from engaging in domestic activities.  The activities outlined by the Committee Reports include foreign leader assassination conspiracies, surveillance on U.S. activists, even plots to disrupt the marriages of activists.

The 1960s and 1970s were a turbulent time for the U.S.  Several social justice movements begun by people of color, primarily the Black Civil Rights Movement, had gripped the conscience and the consciousness of the country.  Blacks’ press for rights was joined by Chicanos, American Indians, Puerto Ricans, and women for the advancement of their own rights.  These social justice claims were joined by sympathetic Whites, especially younger Whites who were also mobilized at the time to stop the Vietnam War.  These mobilized Whites were known inside the FBI as “The New Left” and a Counter-Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) was run against them, too.  The coming-together of these social justice movements is the story of how the people of the United States almost made a successful justice and peace revolution.  Especially when juxtaposed to justice and peace events of today, this was, indeed, a unique moment in the life of the U.S.

It was during this time that the intelligence community of the U.S. took sides.  The COINTELPRO papers and the Church Committee findings document how pervasively government agents acted to take sides and preserve the claims of the status quo architects.  Cunningham asserts that not only totalitarian states, but democratic states, too, are repressive.  This is the context within which Cunningham delves into FBI COINTELPRO repressive practices against New Left activists between 1961 and 1971.

Purpose of the Study

Cunningham sought to understand how social protest movements are affected by repression and to “understand the patterning of repression against protest groups” in the democratic environment of the United States.  The social movement literature up to Cunningham’s research had been conducted with an “implicit assumption . . . that authorities allocate repression . . . in a rational manner.”  This research focused on overt repression that occurs after certain protest activity; researchers often focused on the activists who had been repressed; Cunningham chose to focus on covert repression and on those conducting the repression.  Therefore, Cunningham’s research set its aim directly at the FBI in the COINTELPRO years.

Research Question

Cunningham recognized the limitations in the assumption, in most social movement literature, that repression was meted out on a rational basis.  That is, that state agencies “allocate repression purposefully, with the level of repression increasing with the level of threat.”  Cunningham, then, sought to understand “how organizations allocate repression” and whether there was merit in such an assumption.  Specifically, Cunningham evaluates “three of the most common claims, namely that level of repression is positively related to protest groups’ (1) level of activity, (2) size, and (3) association with previous acts of violence.”

Methods

The data consisted of 2,487 FBI memos spanning the three-year life of COINTELPRO against the New Left.  These memos represent “all known correspondence related to the repression of any New Left target during the time period in question.”   From these FBI memos, Cunningham isolated 59 separate dialogs between FBI Headquarters and individual FBI field offices.  Cunningham then coded each memo with “pertinent background information (date, to/from), as well as its type (14 distinct memo types were used, which are listed in Table 1) and intended target.  Cunningham paid particular attention to any memo that initiated an action against a target, thus shifting that New Left organization from potential threat to active target.  Cunningham does this in order to “test the relative influence of each of the three propositions discussed above, as well as a single proxy of endogenous organizational structure:  whether or not targets were identified and monitored by multiple FBI field offices”—which Cunningham labels as national targets.

After defining his variables of interest–size of New Left organization, its level of activity, its association with violence, whether it was a national target or not, and repression as the dependent variable, Cunningham investigated each New Left local group and performed two regression analyses on repression, Models 1 and 2, without and with, respectively, the “national target” variable.  “Model 2 replicates the first model but also adds an endogenous organizational indicator:  whether each target was recognized as national (i.e., observed by multiple field offices within the FBI).

Results

Cunningham’s results are stunning.  Cunningham finds that protest-group characteristics “poorly predict which New Left groups become targeted for COINTELPRO activity.”  This includes violent activity!  Much more significant, according to Cunningham, “groups considered to be national targets were 12 times as likely to be repressed as local targets.  This relationship is highly significant and dwarfs the effect of the other variables.  This finding clearly points to the necessity of accounting for processes within repressing organizations to understand how repression is allocated, rather than assuming that ‘objectively’ larger threats automatically face higher levels of repression.”  Cunningham then goes on to explain “how endogenous organizational processes shape the allocation of repressive activity by the FBI.”  He concludes that the level of repression meted out to particular New Left groups is “based on how they were ultimately perceived by the directorate at national headquarters.”  So, to reiterate, not size, not violence, not high or low activity determined COINTELPRO repression, but directorate perceptions at the national FBI headquarters determined which groups were targeted for repression.

Cunningham’s analysis delivered an R2 of .12 in Model 1 and of .25 in Model 2, where recognition by FBI Headquarters of a New Left group as a national target was included as one of the predictor variables.

Critique

Cunningham used regression analysis to better understand the relationships between repression and variables related to New Left groups.  He wanted to be able to determine if one variable or a combination of variables was a predictor of repression.  What he found was that the characteristics of New Left groups when sifted through the endogenous processes of FBI headquarters came to determine whether or not a New Left group was targeted for repression.  Purely local groups rarely reached the attention of FBI headquarters—even when they committed acts of violence.  Yet, even inactive national groups—defined as organizations having local representation in at least two local FBI jurisdictions—were repressed.  This finding shatters the “rational actor” assumptions of prior social movement research that repression was meted out according to threat to the status quo or social movement recourse to violence.

Cunningham’s study, innovative and shocking in its results, is not surprising, however.  And in this case, Cunningham leaves his audience hungering for more.  But, because Cunningham limited himself to New Left organizations, important information for students of COINTELPRO remains lacking.

The story of COINTELPRO is about what the FBI and other government agencies did to repress political dissent in the United States.  Unfortunately, its legacy is one of a trail of deaths, including targeted assassinations.  When one understands that COINTELPRO targeted Black civil rights leaders from Malcolm X to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to Black Panther Party members including Fred Hampton and American Indian Movement activists like Ana Mae Pictou Aquash and Puerto Rican Independentistas like Filiberto Ojeda Rios—even after COINTELPRO was supposedly shut down by Congress, it is clear that Cunningham has only touched the surface of those endogenous FBI factors that determined what kind of repression was appropriate for what groups.  Because Cunningham limits himself to a study of New Left organizations, we will never know from his research the role of race and ethnicity in the severity of repression that was meted out to social movements of color and if there was a difference in FBI headquarters treatment of largely White organizations and those organizations led by people of color.  This could have grave consequences for the United States legal standing if it could be shown that the U.S. violated its own laws and international laws and conventions to which it was a signatory.

Cunningham clearly shows us what the next steps are for research in this area.  Given the dearth of scholarship involving COINTELPRO and especially COINTELPRO against organizations of color, this clearly is an area for additional study given the changing legal landscape of today.  What Senator Frank Church called illegal and un-American activities uncovered in COINTELPRO has been made legal by the Patriot Act, the Secret Evidence Act, the Funding the War Against Terrorism Act, and justified policies of targeted assassinations abroad by drone warfare, and secret kill lists that even include U.S. citizens.  Are such policies still un-American?  And if so, what are dissenters to do about them?  What kind of repression can dissenters expect?  And is the severity of repression race and ethnicity based?

Cunningham’s study is so innovative and path-breaking because it shatters the assumption that many researchers held up to the time of his study—2003.  His findings should definitely be built upon for further understanding of how repression is allocated by U.S. government agents.

Cunningham could also have used his same comprehensive data set of COINTELPRO-New Left memos and performed Grounded Theory research.  He might have arrived at the same conclusions, but his starting point of pre-determined variables would have been different.

Cunningham Re-conceptualized

Cunningham’s instinct to challenge the so-called rationalist approach demonstrates to me that what is considered a rational assumption is more easily considered to be rational by those who have not been there—experientially.  Therefore, if I had a “hunch” that those assumptions were not merited, I would probably make my first stop in the libraries of those who had been there inside the FBI either as employees who became whistleblowers or informants or infiltrators, paid agents provocateurs, who later told about their experiences.  I would read their books and then pursue interviews with them, allowing them to tell their stories with little intervention from me.  I would ask them to delve into every aspect of the moments that they spent inside COINTELPRO.  For those who were FBI employees, I would ask them how they felt betraying the Constitution and what national security demands could warrant such behavior from our leaders.  From the informants and infiltrators, I would ask them about the tactics used and how they felt about the individuals they were being paid to betray—like, for example, Malcolm X or Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., or the members of the Black Panther Party—those who personally knew some of the victims of targeted assassination, like Fred Hampton and “Alprentice “Bunchy” Carter.  I would find family members of the targeted individuals and the targeted individuals, themselves, if they were still alive.  And I would explore with them the significance of their experiences as U.S. citizens and at the hands of the FBI.  This would be the phenomenological exploration of my subject matter.  But this would be only the beginning of my journey.

My second stop would have to be with the documents, themselves, that tell an incredible story of lawlessness and interference in the rights of U.S. citizens that few would believe absent the actual documents.  Just as Cunningham examined the memos and was able to shatter academic presumptions about the nature of state-sanctioned repression in the context of COINTELPRO, especially, I would not redo his work, but build upon it.  Cunningham focused on New Left organizations, only.  COINTELPRO operations were carried out against individuals as well as organizations.  I would like to explore the level or severity of repression that was experienced by New Left organizations perhaps as a first block upon which to build on Cunningham.  Eventually, the question must arise and be answered:  What activities of COINTELPRO resulted in murder or assassination?  And because Cunningham opens the discussion of the “patterning” of repression, was there such a pattern with other COINTELPRO-targeted organizations?

I think very few people would justify the government actions that were carried out against activists of the 1960s and 1970s in COINTELPRO.  Certainly, Senator Frank Church, who headed the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities did not, as can be read in the Committee Reports.  What do these Committee findings mean for the nature of U.S. democracy then and now?  This is research that is intended to make a difference:  to practitioners inside government, to activists outside government who dissent from its policies, and to inform others around the world who may be tempted to believe things that are not true—about themselves, the nature of government, the United States, itself.  At a time when Black organizations were formed to press for Black civil and voting rights, the purpose of COINTELPRO against these organizations according to FBI records was to “expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters, and to counter their propensity for violence and civil disorder.”  COINTELPRO against the American Indian Movement that pressed for a right to life and self-determination for indigenous people of the Americas resulted in state-sponsored terror and assassination of Native American leaders.  COINTELPRO against New Left organizations who had formed to support the social justice claims of the Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Blacks, Native Americans, and against the U.S. war in Vietnam was in essence a pro-war policy apparatus that terrorized peace activists and resulted in the murder of four anti-war students at Kent State University.  COINTELPRO was not counter-intelligence, it was counter-democracy.  This kind of research that matters and seeks to make a difference falls into the realm of critical social science.

Finally, acknowledging that which is covert and unpleasant, but very real is the beginning of the process of becoming truly aware.  I call it being able to see the invisible, hear the unspoken, and read the unwritten.  This is an essential skill that determines how aware and self-aware we can truly be.

The methodology that I have just described is mindful inquiry: a holistic way of researching and understanding the U.S. government policy of COINTELPRO.

Rationale for the Redesign

Cunningham shattered inaccurate assumptions with his innovative study of COINTELPRO against New Left organizations.  His quantitative analysis of his research project began with a set of pre-defined variables as he endeavored to tease out the exact nature of their inter-relationships with repression.  In the redesign as outlined above, the researcher and reader would gain a much more comprehensive understanding of the determinants of the allocation of state-sponsored repression in the case of COINTELPRO.  This redesign approach would allow for other variables to be considered than the ones initially offered by Cunningham.  This would also build on Cunningham’s work by providing a fuller understanding of the totality of circumstances that were brought to bear when an individual or organization was targeted by COINTELPRO.  The Church Committee found that the “war” against Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was “no holds barred,” according to the testimony of the FBI Agent who ran the COINTELPRO against Dr. King.

Purpose of the Redesign

The purpose of the redesign would be to enrich the understanding gained from Cunningham’s seminal work that informed us that not even propensity for violence was a predictor of state-sanctioned repression in COINTELPRO.

Methods

The redesigned Cunningham study would be done utilizing Mindful Inquiry as indicated above, utilizing the methods of Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Critical Social Science, and self-awareness.

Data Collection and Participant Selection

As indicated above, the Cunningham redesign would utilize interviews of available principals and a careful read of their books to understand themes that might be developed; official COINTELPRO documents are voluminous and should be sifted for relevancy and coded according to established project criteria.

Discussion

Discussion of the merits of the redesigned project have been contained throughout this paper.  Such a redesign would provide a more comprehensive understanding of COINTELPRO—its motivations and effects on activists in a very important period in the U.S.

For a complete version of this paper with footnotes included: The Patterning of Repression- FBI Counterintelligence and the New Left